In the run-up to the December 2009 Copenhagen climate conference, the authors surveyed members of the international development community with a special interest in climate change on three sets of detailed questions: (1) what action different country groups should take to limit climate change; (2) how much non-market funding there should be for emissions reductions and adaptation in developing countries, and how it should be allocated; and (3) which institutions should be involved in delivering climate assistance, and how the system should be governed. About 500 respondents from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19-24, 2009. About a third of the respondents grew up in developing countries, although some of them now live in developed countries. A broad majority of respondents from both developing and developed countries held very similar views on the responsibilities of the two different country groups, including on issues that have been very controversial in the negotiations. Most favored binding commitments now by developed countries, and commitments by 2020 by 'advanced developing countries' (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and others), limited use of offsets by developed countries, strict monitoring of compliance with commitments, and the use of trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in very narrow circumstances. Respondents from developing countries favored larger international transfers than those from developed countries, but the two groups share core ideas on how transfers should be allocated. Among institutional options for managing climate programs, a plurality of respondents from developed (48 percent) and developing (56 percent) countries preferred a UN-managed world climate fund, while many from both groups also embraced the UN Adaptation Fund's approach, which is to accredit national institutions within countries which are eligible to manage implementation of projects that the Fund finances. Among approaches to governance, the most support went to the Climate Investment Fund model-of equal representation of developing and developed countries on the board. 
2 multiple possible actors than to reliance primarily on existing institutions. The idea of a new UNFCCCmanaged world climate fund had the most support (50% thought it should take on "very broad responsibilities") and the most detractors (17% thought the institution "should not play any role"), the latter primarily from developed countries. All participant groups liked the approach of delegating implementation to accredited domestic institutions in developing countries. Involving bilateral aid agencies met with little support among either group. Their opinions of current multilateral organizations diverged: developing-country respondents felt much more positive toward the UN and regional development banks than towards the World Bank; in contrast, developed country respondents preferred the World Bank over the UN and the regional banks.
Attitudes toward governance arrangements were generally skeptical, with broad approval from both regional groups only for the approach taken by the Climate Investment Funds, where developing and developed countries hold equal numbers of board seats, and decision-making is by consensus.
Developing-country respondents in particular favored this idea, over and above a 'one country, one vote' approach. Many respondents commented on the need to transcend the dichotomy between 'developing' and 'developed' countries, and to forge compromise on governance.
In summary, the survey showed consensus among a diverse group of respondents in agreement on what actions to take. Preferences on burden-sharing varied across the two main country groups, but respondents shared common views on the use of funds. Respondents were not unanimous in their views of institutions and governance arrangements, but they tended to favor reform and compromise proposals.
Introduction: a diverse, highly educated group of respondents, with a focus on development and the environment Overall, 479 respondents from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19-24, 2009 . About 28% of the respondents identified themselves as having grown up in a developing country, and 27% percent currently live in a developing country (this includes some who were born in a developed country). 1 (Numbers of respondents by country of origin and country of residence are shown in Annex 1.) More than a third of respondents (36%) now live in a country different from their country of birth.
The survey was targeted to recipients of CGD's climate newsletter, although it was open to all, and was advertized on CGD's website. As intended, the sample consisted primarily of professionals interested in or active in the development community, 2 and with a special awareness of climate change. Indeed, 35% of respondents work professionally on climate issues, and 44% on other environmental issues -a higher share among developing-country respondents in both cases. 3 Nearly all respondents follow Copenhagen-related news either regularly (55%) or occasionally (41%).
Respondents were highly educated, with about half holding Masters degrees as their highest qualification, and a quarter holding PhDs. A plurality was trained in economics (28%), and somewhat fewer in the sciences or engineering (23%) or other social sciences (22%). These profiles were very similar among developing and developed-country respondents. More than two-thirds work in public or quasi-public jobs, a larger share among those who grew up in developing countries. Respondents of all ages (19-87 years) took the survey; the median age was 45, with far fewer respondents above the age 1 We use the terms 'developed countries' and 'developing countries' in the sense in which they are used in the climate negotiations. Thus, 'developed countries' refers to the countries included in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, i.e., those that are obliged to reduce emissions. Annex I countries include all OECD members with the exception of Korea and Mexico, as well as other high-income countries and most transition economies. Since we find that the country where respondents grew up proved generally a more consistent predictor of attitudes than country of residence, we refer to respondents who grew up in developing countries as "developing-country respondents," regardless of current residence (and correspondingly for "developed-country respondents"). 2 In addition to statistics presented here, consult Annex 2 for a list of professional affiliations to further illustrate this claim. 3 Where this summary makes positive statements on whether distributions are similar or different over sample groups, it means to imply statistically significant relationships that were significant at the 0.1 level, in normal-based or distribution-free tests, as appropriate in the relevant context. Given the limited sample size, the summary does not distinguish between different significance levels. Where the analysis makes conditional statements on relationships, it means to imply that the relationship could not be disproven, but was not entirely robust to different specifications. See section two for details. of 65 among developing-country respondents (1.7%) than in developed countries (10%). About 35% of participants were women, fewer among developing-country respondents (26%).
The survey allowed participants to self-select, and did not intend to gather a sample that would be representative of any larger population group. It sought to elicit views on detailed questions of implementation, rather than general attitudes. Hence, David Wheeler's (2007) observation in the context of a survey using a similar approach is relevant that "random sampling on such a specialized topic in large, diffuse populations would confront validity problems because many respondents would lack the requisite information." 4 In giving voice to the opinions of its respondent group, the survey aims to supplement the findings of more extensive recent surveys, including internationally representative public attitudes polls conducted by PIPA/World Bank and HSBC, and GlobeScan's key respondent surveys. By comparison to the former, the present survey asked more complex questions relating to implementation and governance. By comparison to the latter, it sought to elicit the views of respondents who work professionally on, or have a pronounced interest in development. Unlike the respondents to previous surveys, this group of respondents appears well-positioned to draw upon specialized knowledge of the lessons of development assistance and apply it when considering alternative approaches for delivering potentially large amounts of climate-related funding from the rich world to the developing world.
The remainder of this paper is organized in two sections. Section one discusses the main results qualitatively. Section 2 provides detailed results and a technical note. The analysis focuses on differences and similarities in the views of developing and developed-country respondents, as well as among somewhat more disaggregated regional groups (U.S. respondents, respondents from other developed countries, from the 'advanced developing countries' 5 , from Sub-Saharan Africa, and from other developing countries). It occasionally discusses how other respondent characteristics correlate with views. 4 David Wheeler (2007) , "It's One World out There: The Global Consensus in Selecting the World Bank's next President." Working Paper Number 123, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. 5 As the survey noted, "The term 'advanced developing countries' intends to distinguish between countries with relatively high and relatively low emissions and capacity. For instance, Japan mentions "Parties which have a substantial contribution to the global emissions of greenhouse gases and have appropriate response capacities." The EU suggests that "OECD members and candidates for membership thereof" should take more action. This would include Korea and Mexico as OECD members, and countries with "enhanced engagement, with a view to possible membership," namely Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa. This is probably the list of countries that those who want to make a distinction among developing countries have in mind."
Main results

1.1
Broad consensus on what action should be taken Given the amount of acrimony over these issues in the negotiations, it is surprising how few differences in opinion emerged among respondents. Consensus extends also to what respondents are willing to do privately, as expressed by willingness to pay for a (hypothetical) guarantee that there would never be climate change that respondents would consider 'dangerous'. Median willingness to pay (5% of household income p.a.) was higher than most projections of the cost of effective action. A large majority (86%) felt that they were willing to pay as much or more than they expected effective action to limit climate change to cost. Developing-country respondents were less optimistic that this would be enough to cover the cost of effective action. The survey invited respondents to provide additional comments on the questions asked. 7 On adaptation, many comments highlighted that the chief challenge was that "absorptive capacity is high in some countries, … but these are not likely to be the hot-spots of vulnerability, like Sub-Saharan Africa or small islands." Therefore, "effective spending of short-term finance is contingent on major capacity building," and there is a premium on strengthening accountability. Additional allocation criteria proposed included funding shovel-ready projects and co-benefits in job creation or ecosystem services.
In allocating funds for emissions reductions, many respondents considered cost-effectiveness to be the most important factor, but noted that it can be "at odds with developing new technologies, which will likely be inefficient at first -so balance will have to be the goal." They considered that the relative weight of these criteria might have to shift over time. Respondents thought that in addition to characteristics measured in governance indicators, important dimensions of 'capacity' included monitoring capacity and the track record in implementing national development plans and PRSPs 8 .
Possible additional allocation criteria included: development co-benefits; recipient ownership of plans;
and supporting countries ready to systematically integrate low-carbon growth into their development plans.
9
1.3 Building an international architecture for implementation: appetite for innovation
The survey asked which institutions should manage international cooperation and especially financial transfers. It also considered which governance arrangements should be used in overseeing their work.
The need to find effective mechanisms for these tasks will loom large in delivering the emissions reduction and adaptation investment the world needs. Due to slow overall progress in the negotiations, however, ideas about institutional roles and the governance options for implementation remain poorly defined.
All participants, and in particularly those from developing countries, generally had more positive views on the prospect of involving a given institution in delivering climate assistance than on current and possible future governance arrangements. Respondents' comments suggested that this trend might be consistent with immediate concern to ensure effective delivery of enough assistance, along with disenchantment with the current governance of international institutions. countries … a new fund with its own secretariat is needed." Some were particularly concerned that the Bank's role in funding coal power undermined its credibility in delivering climate funds. Yet, others worried whether "we can spare the time to build a new World Climate Fund," noted that setting it up might require "a great amount of resources that could be used to improve the climate change effects,"
and feared lack of buy-in from contributors.
Many comments sought middle ground. A number focused on the need to establish a coordination function. Indeed, many who favored a new climate organization viewed its role primarily in overseeing the efforts of diverse players "involved in implementation according to their comparative advantages." In addition, many emphasized the need to reform existing institutions. Thus, one respondent thought that "overlaying new institutions on existing ones because of lack of trust or control is the wrong idea." Rather, "existing mechanisms, like the World Bank, which have the resources and capacity to be helpful need to be retooled so that they are making better decisions (i.e., not funding new coal fired thermal generation)." Others noted that such reform could complement the approach of giving a larger role to UNFCCC-accredited domestic institutions. While comments were universally positive on this approach, some cautioned that "the UNFCCC has got to be holier than the Divergences between developing and developed-country respondents in their attitudes toward different governance models were considerable. It is striking that, when pooling observations from both groups, a plurality thought that all but one possible arrangement should "not be considered at all."
By far the most popular arrangement, and the only one to meet with approval from both groups, was a CIF-like approach, where developing and developed countries hold equal numbers of board seats, and decision-making is by consensus. Developing-country respondents in particular favored this idea.
Indeed, more developing-country respondents felt that a CIF-like arrangement was at least "good" (62%) than held this view on a UN-like arrangement (57%), and fewer felt it "should not be considered at all."
Respondents were nearly unanimous in their rejection of shareholder voting and in viewing weighted shareholder voting (by the inverse of per-capita emissions) skeptically. A 'one country, one vote' approach was quite popular with developing-country respondents, but not with developed-country participants. Disagreement was somewhat less sharp on an arrangement like the Adaptation Fund Board, where developing countries hold a majority of board seats, but fewer than are required for decision-making. (The survey's description of this approach as a "blocking minority" was regrettable in retrospect, and may well have unduly biased the answers.)
In their comments, respondents generally noted that the key challenge of making governance arrangements legitimate in the eyes of both contributors and recipients was well-known from the aid debate. However, an interesting common reaction was that respondents did not necessarily discuss the issue along the familiar battle lines of 'one country, one vote' versus shareholder voting. Rather, much attention focused on designing governance arrangements appropriate for the specific task of governing climate funds. This reasoning led many to support a CIF-like compromise. Some commented favorably on the idea of weighted shareholder voting, noting that the approach would reward developing countries for their actions to keep per-capita emissions low. Others proposed that weighting could also be carried out by vulnerability to climate impacts, (giving those with the most to lose a larger say), or a country's potential for emission reductions (making sure countries where most progress is possible consider themselves well-represented). Yet, others cautioned that weighted shareholder voting was "too complex and susceptible to political influence. If used we would spend more time arguing over the ratios than working on climate change." A certain share of those who began taking the survey (13%) abandoned it after answering the questions on the first page (Action and Burden Sharing). This is not surprising: the survey was more technical and time-consuming than many other online surveys. Developing-country respondents were significantly more likely to abandon the survey after the first page (19%) than respondents born or resident in developed countries (10%). Those who exited the survey provided no demographic information beyond the countries where they were born and now live. Hence, it is not possible to investigate bias in incomplete answers beyond country of origin and residency.
We find very little evidence that those who abandoned the survey after filling in the first page answered the initial questions differently than respondents who submitted a more complete set of to otherwise dispute the scientific consensus on global warming.
Analytical strategy
Where survey choices were binary, we used probit models to estimate how demographic variables influenced the likelihood of choices; where the survey offered more than two categorical choices, we used (maximum likelihood) multinomial logit models to estimate how demographics influenced the likelihood that respondents chose a given alternative to the modal response. Where there were more than two choices with a natural ordinal meaning (for instance, increasing levels of funding), we present results from ordered logistic regressions. We coded all dependent variables so that higher values (and in the attached tables, greater coefficients) indicate stronger preference for the proposition at issue. We tested robustness of ordered logit results by estimating a probit model, coding the dependent variable 0 and 1 for the two most adverse and most positive choices, respectively, as well as by estimating GLS over imputed values. We omit results from robustness checks for conciseness.
We explored the association between demographics and choice in two model specifications. An extended model included country groups, academic training, discipline trained in, employer type, gender, age, and information on whether respondents work professionally on the climate change or the environment. Given the limited sample size, we also considered a sparser model that includes only country groups, discipline trained in, gender, and information on professional work on climate or the environment. Both specifications were tested with a simple breakdown of respondents into developing and developed country groups, and in five regional groups (U.S.; other developed countries; BRICS plus Mexico and Korea; other developing countries; Africa.).
In the present analysis, where we made positive statements on relationships between choices and demographic background, we wanted to imply that the hypothesis stated was significant at least at the 90% level, in the two models, as well as in a univariate context and in simple distribution-free tests (Chi-square tests and rank-sum or sign-rank tests, as appropriate). Where we stated that there may be a relationship, we wanted to indicate that the association whose statistical significance was not entirely robust.
What kind of action from which countries?
Tables 1.1-1.5 present regression results for the survey questions on action to limit climate change.
Significance patterns were generally thin. We leave it to the reader to peruse the tables, and note here only some results that strike us as interesting.
Economists were more likely than scientists and engineers to favor binding portfolios of actions from advanced developing countries over non-binding goals. Those working on the environment may have been more likely than others to favor intensity targets or soft caps over binding targets. pessimistic than others about the cost of avoiding dangerous climate change, as were those who professionally work on the environment. Scientists and engineers, as well as social scientists other than economists showed considerably higher willingness to pay than other professional groups.
Funding allocation, governance and institutions
Ordered logit results immediately reflect the divergence between developing and developed-country respondents on the question of what amounts of funding would be equitable and useful. (Table 2) Interestingly, those trained in the sciences and engineering (and to a lesser degree, social scientists other than economists) were consistently more likely to favor high adaptation funding than economists, perhaps reflecting different relative importance these two professional groups attached to climate impacts and to capacity constraints.
Developing-country respondents were more likely to think that past performance and opening up new opportunities should play a role. These results largely held across more disaggregated country groups.
On adaptation funding, developed-country respondents were less likely to favor need, an even distribution of funds, but also past performance. (Tables 3.1 
-3.2)
In addition to the main results presented above, we find ( Table 4 .2) that among regional groups, U.S.
respondents tended to feel most adversely toward the UN, African respondents were the most likely to view a CIF-like arrangement positively, and African and BRICS+ respondents tended to take an interest in weighted shareholder voting. Scientists tended to favor, a CIF approach; climate professionals tended to disfavor it. Concerning institutions, ( 
